Examining the effect of corporate and capital structure on operational efficiency in Chilean firms

Jorge Andrés Muñoz Mendoza, Sandra María Sepúlveda Yelpo, Carmen Lissette Veloso Ramos, Carlos Leandro Delgado Fuentealba


We analyzed the effects of corporate and capital structures on the operational efficiency of Chilean companies. Corporate structure was measured by ownership structure and managerial discretion while capital structure is quantified by indebtedness, short-term debt and the commercial relationship with funders. Based on data from the Longitudinal Business Survey (LBS), we formulated a regression model using instrumental variables (IV) to determine these effects. Our results suggest that ownership dilution has different effects depending on company size. In small firms, ownership dilution reduces operational efficiency, while in large firms it increases. As for managerial discretion, this only negatively affects the operational efficiency of small firms with diluted ownership. Leverage, short-term debt and monitoring by external funders act as effective forms of control that drive operational efficiency in Chilean companies.


Operational efficiency; ownership structure; managerial discretion; monitoring

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